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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we would like to disseminate a serendipitous
discovery involving Lyapunov exponents of a 1-D time series
and their use in serving as a filtering defense tool against a
specific kind of deep adversarial perturbation. To this end,
we use the state-of-the-art CleverHans library to generate
adversarial perturbations against a standard Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) architecture trained on the MNIST
as well as the Fashion-MNIST datasets. We empirically
demonstrate how the Lyapunov exponents computed on the
flattened 1-D vector representations of the images served as
highly discriminative features that could be to pre-classify
images as adversarial or legitimate before feeding the image
into the CNN for classification. We also explore the issue of
possible false-alarms when the input images are noisy in a
non-adversarial sense.
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1. BACKGROUND ON DEFENSES AGAINST
ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
In the recent past, a plethora of defenses against adver-
sarial attacks have been proposed. These include SafetyNet
[13], adversarial training [21], label smoothing [22], defen-
sive distillation [19] and feature-squeezing [24, 25] to name
a few. There is also an ongoing Kaggle contest[2] underway
for exploring novel defenses against adversarial attacks.
As evinced by the recent spurt in the papers written on
this topic, most defenses proposed are quelled by a novel
attack that exploits some weakness in the defense. In [10],
the authors queried if one could concoct a strong defense by
combining multiple defenses and showed that an ensemble of
weak defenses was not sufficient in providing strong defense
against adversarial examples that they were able to craft.
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In the accompanying blog1 associated with [17], the authors
Goodfellow and Papernot posit that Adversarial examples
are hard to defend against because it is hard to construct a
theoretical model of the adversarial example crafting process
and contend with the idea if attacking machine learning eas-
ier than defending it?
With this background, we shall now look more closely at a
specific type of defense and motivate the relevance of our
method within this framework.
1.1 The pre-detector based defenses
One prominent approach that emerges in the literature
of adversarial defenses is that of crafting pre-detection and
filtering systems that flag inputs that might be potentially
adversarial. In [9], the authors posit that adversarial ex-
amples are not drawn from the same distribution as the le-
gitimate samples and can thus be detected using statistical
tests. In [15, 7], the authors train a separate binary classifier
to first classify any input image as legitimate or adversarial
and then perform inference on the passed images. In ap-
proaches such as [6], the authors assume that DNNs classify
accurately only near the small manifold of training data and
that the synthetic adversarial samples do not lie on the data
manifold. They applying dropout at test time to ascertain
the confidence of adversariality of the input image.
In this paper, we would like to disseminate a model-agnostic
approach towards adversarial defense that is dependent purely
on the quasi-time-series statistics of the input images that
was discovered in a rather serendipitous fashion. The goal is
to not present the method we propose as a fool-proof adver-
sarial filter, but to instead draw the attention of the DNN
and CV communities towards this chance discovery that we
feel is worthy of further inquiry.
In order to facilitate reproducibility of results and effective
criticism, we have duly open-sourced the implementation
as a well annotated jupyter-notebook shared at the follow-
ing location: https://github.com/vinayprabhu/Lyapunov
defense
2. PROCEDURE FOLLOWED
2.1 A quick introduction to Lyapunov expo-
nents
For a given a scalar time series {xt; t = 1, ..., n} whose
time evolution is assumed to be modeled by a differentiable
1http://www.cleverhans.io/security/privacy/ml/2017/02/
15/why-attacking-machine-learning-is-easier-than-defending-it.
html
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dynamical system (in a phase-space of possibly infinite di-
mensions), we can define Lyapunov exponents corresponding
to the large-time behavior of the system. These character-
istic exponents numerically quantify the sensitivity to the
initial conditions and emanate from the Ergodic theory of
differentiable dynamical systems, introduced by Eckmann
and Ruelle in [5, 4]. Simply put, if the initial state of a
time series is slightly perturbed, the characteristic exponent
(or Lyapunov exponents) represent the exponential rate at
which the perturbation increases (or decreases) with time.
For a detailed understanding of these characteristic expo-
nents, we would like to refer the user to [5, 4].
Given a finite-length finite-precision time series sequence,
the 3 stage Embed-Tangent maps-QR decomposition based
recipe introduced in [4] can be used to numerically compute
the Lyapunov exponents. This numerical recipe is imple-
mented in many time-series analysis packages such as [1].
The background of the serendipitous discovery was that we
were investigating usage of metrics from time-series analy-
sis literature to identify adversarial attacks on 1-D axis-wise
mobile-phone motion sensor data ;example, Accelerometer
and gyroscope (see [20]) and we realized that this procedure
could be easily extended to vectorized images (or flattened
images viewed as discrete time series indexed by the pixel
location. That is, given a normalized image, X ∈ [0, 1]n×n,
we would have the flattened time-series representation x ∈
[0, 1]n
2
as simply,
xin+j = Xi,j ; i, j = 0, ...n− 1; (1)
3. EXPERIMENTS
In this paper, we used the MNIST [11] dataset. In the
appendix, we showcase similar results obtained with the
Fashion-MNIST dataset [23] as well. The rest of this section
details the different stages involved in our experimentation.
3.1 Generating targeted adversarial perturba-
tions
We targeted 10 random samples from the MNIST dataset
(1 belong to each class/digit) using the Carlini-Wagner-l2
attack ([3]) in the targeted mode implemented in the Clev-
erHans library ([17]) with the following parameterization.
cw_params = {’binary_search_steps’: 1,
’y_target’: adv_ys,
’max_iterations’: attack_iterations,
’learning_rate’: 0.1,
’batch_size’: source_samples * nb_classes,
’initial_const’: 10}
The resultant image grid containing the images along with
the adversarially perturbed counterparts are as shown in fig
1(a). Fig 1(b) showcases the norm-distance between the
images and their adversarial examples.
3.2 Computing Lyapunov exponents of the flat-
tened images
The lyapunov exponents of the flattened images show-
cased in fig 1(a) were numerically computed with the lyap_e()
method implemented in [1] with the following parameteriza-
tion:
PARAM_MNSIT={emb_dim=10, matrix_dim=4,
min_nb=min(2 * matrix_dim, matrix_dim + 4),
min_tsep=0, tau=1}
An example images along with its flattened quasi-time-series
representation and the computed Lyapunov exponents is
shown in fig 4(a). Notice the change of sign of the lyapunov
exponents between the true image and the adversarial im-
ages. In time-series analysis, the existence of at least one
positive Lyapunov exponent is interpreted as a strong indi-
cator for chaos. As we introduce more adversarial noise, the
prevalence of positive Lyapunov exponents becomes more
prevalent. Fig 5, contains an example of an image (digit-5)
and all its 9 associated adversarially perturbed counterparts
(each targeting a different class) and their lyapunov expo-
nents.
3.3 Unsupervised clustering of input images
based on Lyapunov exponents
In fig 4(b), where we have showcased the scatter-plot of
the first 2 lyapunov exponents, we see clear clustering be-
tween the legitimate examples and the adversarial examples.
We see that the only adversarial examples that are inside
the cluster of legitimate examples are those where the tar-
get class is the same as the true class. (These are images
whose every element is just a fixed ε offset from the true
image)
3.4 Supervised classification
Detection can also be performing from the viewpoint of
outlier detection where we train a one-class classifier (ex:
Isolation-Forest [12]) with just the inlier (legitimate) im-
ages’ lyapunov exponents used during training. Fig 3(a)
shows the heatmap of the features in the train and test sub-
sets (200: Training samples| 300 Test samples of which 200
are legitimate and 100 are adversarial). We received 100%
attacker rejection rate and a 83.5% true acceptance rate (or
a 16.5% False-alarm rate) with no feature engineering or
hyper-parameter tuning. Fig 3(b) showcases the scatter-
plot of the train and test samples along with the decision
boundaries found by the isolation forest algorithm.
3.5 Effect of non-adversarial noise on the de-
tection performance
In order to ascertain the effect of non-adversarial noise
on the detection performance, we chose the following noise
models 2:
[’gaussian’,’pepper’,’poisson’,’salt’,
’Salt and Pepper’,’Speckle’,’local-variance Gaussian’]
(Here ’local-variance Gaussian’ refers to Gaussian-distributed
additive noise with specified local variance at each pixel of
the image).
The effect of these noise-models on the image and its lya-
punov exponents are shown in fig 2. As seen, the ’local-
variance Gaussian’ noise has the most discernible effect on
the lyapunov exponents and hence is chosen as the model of
choice to perturb the legitimate images with.
3.6 Augmenting the dataset with non-adversarial
perturbed images
2http://scikit-image.org/docs/dev/api/skimage.util.html
(a) Image grid with legitimate MNIST images and their adver-
sarial counterparts
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(b) Norm distances for the images in the grid (between legit-
imate F-MNIST images and their adversarial counterparts)
Figure 1: In the left sub-figure above, the [i, j]th grid image is an image belong to the jth class adversarially
perturbed to be classified as belonging to the ith class
Original image 
[-0.15204129 -1.18814337 -1.70479167 -1.75485373] gaussian:[ 0.28242487  0.07765591 -0.06113432 -0.38037845] pepper:[ 0.02092013 -0.96793717 -1.33508384 -1.61110401] poisson:[-0.14193536 -1.17601728 -0.98012441 -2.26296401]
salt:[ 0.09110281 -0.4430038  -1.15924442 -1.60302079] s&p:[ 0.05007739 -0.78992772 -1.35534716 -1.78148997] speckle:[-0.27073824 -1.11521339 -1.52682781 -2.10146165] localvar:[ 0.28221309  0.07588112 -0.07270029 -0.25669238]
Figure 2: The images of an example image sample (5) along with its noisy counterparts and their Lyapunov
coefficients
We added the training datasets with 100 noisy images
(with Gaussian perturbations) and re-train the isoforest clas-
sifier. The results are as shown in fig 3.5. We see that the
false alarm rate drops to 15% while the attacker rejection
rate is almost unchanged (only 1 attacker image is accepted
in).
We further observe that when the magnitude of random
noise is selected from the distribution of norm distances
among adversarial perturbations, the classifier retains its
ability to distinguish between adversarially perturbed and
randomly perturbed images.
3.7 Testing the defense with other attacks
We consider whether the Lyapunov method can be used
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Figure 3: Iso-Forest scatter-plot with Gaussian noise
perturbed examples
to detect adversarial perturbations from attacks other than
the Carlini-Wagner-l2 attack. We consider the Fast Gradi-
ent Sign Method [8], the Jacobian Saliency Map Attack [18],
DeepFool [16], and the attack presented by Madry et al [14].
We consider both the targeted and untargeted versions of
each attack, where applicable3. We use the default param-
eters of the CleverHans library wherever possible. Where
CleverHans does not provide a default value, we use the val-
ues referenced in the original paper describing the attack.
We find that when trained on only the first two Lyapunov
exponents, the isolation forest does poorly on most of the
attacks. However, accuracy improves significantly when we
train on four-dimensional data. In both cases, we train using
natural MNIST images as the inlier set. The true negative
3DeepFool does not have a targeted variant.
rates for these two classifiers on data generated by each of
the attacks are presented in Table 3.7.
Attack Targeted/Untargeted 2D 4D
Carlini Wagner Targeted 0.90 0.91
Untargeted 1.0 1.0
FGSM Targeted 0.0 0.62
Untargeted 0.0 0.8
JSMA Targeted 0.03 0.04
Untargeted 0.03 0.04
Madry et al. Targeted 0.0 1.0
Untargeted 0.0 1.0
DeepFool Targeted NA NA
Untargeted 1.0 1.0
Table 1: True positive rates for several targeted and
untargeted attacks.
3.8 Testing the effect of a new attack
In previous sections, we used a 1-class Isolation Forest
classifier to learn an inlier set of unmodified images. In this
experiment, we test whether a classifier trained on both pos-
itive and negative data generated using known adversarial
attacks can outperform the 1-class classifier.
We train a logistic regression model on unmodified MNIST
images and data generated using all but one of the untar-
geted attacks from the previous section. We then evaluate
the model on a validation set consisting of natural images
and images modified using the left-out attack. We find that
the logistic model is able to achieve near-perfect performance
on four out of five attacks. The model only fails to perform
on data generated using JSMA, achieving an AUROC score
of 0.61. On all other attacks, the model reaches an AUROC
score between 0.97 and 1.0. Exact AUROC scores and ROC
curves are shown in Figure 9.
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Via this paper, we have sought to disseminate a serendip-
itous discovery entailing usage of lyapunov exponents as a
model-agnostic tool that can be used to pre-filter input im-
ages as potentially adversarially perturbed. We have shown
the validity of the idea defensing against images that were
adversarially perturbed using the Carlini-Wager-l2 attack
procedure across 2 datasets, namely MNIST and fashion-
MNIST.
We have used the latest version of CleverHans library (ver-
sion : 2.0.0-7f7f9b18a1988fdf6d37d5c40deabae6) and have
open-sourced the code to ensure repeatability of the results
presented here.
We are currently investigating its potential across various
other datasets and attacks.
(a) An image (class-5- MNIST), its flattened quasi-time-
series representation obtained by flattening
(b) 2-D PCA embedding of the lyapunov exponents for the
100 images from the MNIST dataset shown in Fig 1(a)
Figure 4: Quasi-time-series representations of an ex-
ample image and their Lyapunov exponents
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Figure 5: Example of an image (Number 5) along with its ensemble of adversarial counterparts targeting
different classes. The Lyapunov exponents are as shown in the titles of the constituent images
Figure 6: 2-D PCA embedding of the lyapunov exponents for the 100 images from the Fashion-MNIST
dataset
Figure 7: 2-D PCA embedding of the lyapunov exponents for the 100 images from the Fashion-MNIST
dataset
Figure 8: Example of an image (Shoe) along with its ensemble of adversarial counterparts targeting different
classes. The Lyapunov exponents are as shown in the titles of the constituent images
Figure 9: ROC curves for logistic models trained on all but one attack and tested on the left out attack.
